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DEMOCRATIE ET SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIE CONFRONTEES AUX 
CAPITALISMES CONTEMPORAINS : Une analyse régulationniste 
Robert Boyer 
 
Résumé 
 
Les transformations à long terme et la diversité contemporaine des relations croisées entre Etat, société 
civile et économie sont analysées à la lumière de recherches en économie politique, tant anciennes que 
récentes. L’hypothèse de complémentarité institutionnelle utilisée par la théorie de la régulation pour 
rendre compte de la cohérence des régimes de  croissance est ici étendue à l’étude des relations mutuelles 
entre sphères politique et économique. En dépit de processus communs d’individualisation, de 
globalisation et de fianciarisation, coexistent, aujourd’hui encore, différents régimes socioéconomiques et 
politiques. Une mise en perspective des mérites comparés du capitalisme libéral, du social-libéralisme et 
d’une nouvelle social-démocratie suggère que ce dernier régime est le mieux placé pour limiter le 
processus de de-démocratisation mis en avant par Charles Tilly dans son ouvrage « Democracy » publié en 
2007. La nouvelle social-démocratie serait-elle le meilleur rempart contre le désenchantement 
contemporain concernant la démocratie ? Le charme de cette hypothèse peu conventionnelle doit être 
tempéré par le fait que la social-démocratie – pas plus que la démocratie libérale – ne peut s’importer telle 
quelle mais que ses principes de base doivent connaître un processus d’hybridation avec des traditions 
nationales variées qu’elles soient étatiques en France ou méso-corporatistes au Japon, sachant que l’enjeu 
tient à la prise en compte des nouvelles demandes exprimées par les différentes sociétés civiles.  
 
Democracy and Social Democracy facing Contemporary 
Capitalisms: A “régulationist” approach 
 
Abstract 
 
This article surveys some old and recent political economy research about the long term transformations 
and contemporary diversity in the mutual relationships between State, civil society and the economy. The 
hypothesis of institutional complementarity is extended from the institutional forms that sustain 
“regulation” modes to the analysis of the spill over from the polity to the economy and conversely from the 
economy to the polity. In spite of common challenges originating from individualization, globalization and 
financiarization, contrasted national trajectories for socio-economic and political regimes still coexist in 
contemporary world. The assessment of the relative merits of liberal capitalism, social-liberalism and 
renewed social-democracy suggests that the later regime is the best suited to limit the process of de-
democratization to follow the concept coined by Charles Tilly in his 2007 book on “Democracy”. Would 
social-democracy be the best rampart against the contemporary disenchantment about democracy? This 
unconventional hypothesis has to be mitigated by the fact that social-democracy – but also liberal 
democracy – cannot be imported as such. Its basic principles have to follow a process of hydridization 
according to various national traditions, let them be statist in France or meso-coporatist in Japan since the 
new demands from diverse civil societies have to be taken into account. 
 
JEL Classification: A12 – G30 – H10 – I31 – P16 – P51 
Mots Clés : Variété des Capitalismes – Evolutions à long terme du capitalisme – Hypothèse de 
complémentarité institutionnelle – Régimes socioéconomiques et politiques – Libéralisme – 
Variété des formes de démocratie – Ancienne et nouvelle social-démocratie – Théorie de la 
régulation. 
Keywords :  Variety of capitalisms – Long run evolutions of capitalism – Institutional complementarity 
hypothesis – socioeconomic–political regimes – Liberalism – Variety of democracies – Old 
and new social-democracy – Régulation Theory. 
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INTRODUCTION: WHAT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ECONOMY AND 
POLITY IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETIES? 
After the collapse of Soviet Union, many observers and analysts had accepted a common 
diagnosis concerning the future of modern societies: they should converge towards a canonical 
socioeconomic regime featuring the complementarity between a market economy and the 
diffusion of democracy (Fukuyama, 1992). They were supposed to replace the previous planed 
economies governed by authoritarian political regimes. In retrospect, this prognosis is far from 
confirmed by the evolution of the two last decades. On one side, the transition from plan to 
market has proven to be much more difficult than expected (World Bank, 1993). Instead of being 
an obstacle to the implementation of market logic, a form of another of State is required in order 
to deliver the prerequisites for the implementation of market mechanisms. On the other side, 
democracy does not appear any more as the automatic outcome of the collapse of authoritarian 
regimes. Clearly, the political transformations in Iraq from instance have not at all followed the 
same trajectory than Europe or Japan after the Second World War: social peace, empowerment 
of citizens and democratization. Organizing general elections does not necessarily open the path 
to democratization. Similarly, a modern, efficient and legitimate State cannot be imported, since it 
has to be generated by the very domestic processes of interacting and negotiating socioeconomic 
groups (Fukuyama, 2004).  
 
Therefore, most social sciences have to face a basic challenge, i.e. to provide tools and theories in 
order to understand these quite complex processes. Under this respect, the so-called French 
Régulation School has precisely the objective to enlighten the structural transformations that are 
taking place since the demise of the post World War II golden age. The present paper aims at 
presenting some of the related results and to enlarge the scope of Régulation Theory in the 
direction of a political economy of the various mixes of democracy and capitalism. It is first 
argued that capitalism emerged out of the struggles of merchants, industrialists and financiers in 
order to be independent from the direct control of political power, but that the progressive rise 
of market relations has called for a new role of the State in the domain of money and credit, 
taxation and public spending and even external trade (I). In order to assess the possible impact of 
democracy upon the evolution of capitalism, it is important to try to propose a rather general 
definition of democracy, that would incorporate its historical developments (II) Therefore, the 
political organization has to be compatible with, if not complementary to, a configuration of 
capitalism, but historical as well as comparative analyses suggest that there is not a single one best 
way in terms of State and capitalism configurations (III). What is the role of ideas in the related 
processes? Many social scientists tend to overemphasize the impact of liberalism upon the 
constitution of modern societies. By contrast, Régulation Theory stresses the role of collective 
actors defending their own interests and not so much that of theoreticians and intellectuals. 
Consequently, the links between liberalism, at the dual level of polity and economy, and the 
actual trajectory of democracy and capitalism are much more complex than considered by 
typically ideological interpretations of modern societies (IV). Nevertheless, some régulationist 
researches have pointed out a conjecture about the links between economic and social democracy 
on one side, economic performance on the other side: the insertion of the diversity of 
socioeconomic groups in the political process governing economic policy may help the long run 
viability of a growth regime (V). The rest of the paper is devoted to some analyses of the factors 
that shape the future of democracy, with a special emphasis upon the fate of social-democratic 
regimes. How to explain the following paradox: finally democracy is diffusing to Eastern and 
Central European countries and most Latin-American countries, whereas many political scientists 
point out the limits and the risks upon democracy in old democratic societies (VI). It is then 
important to contrast Scandinavian countries and its possible demise by a form of social three 
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contemporary configurations: liberal capitalism, social liberalism and the renewed social 
democracy that emerged out its major crises of the 80s and 90s (VII). Finally, there is a surprising 
convergence between the most recent régulationist researches and the findings of some social and 
political historians, such as Charles Tilly, in the diagnosis of the flux of the forces that push 
toward more democracy and those that imply a decline in the empowerment of the citizens. In 
this framework, democracy appears much more resilient in social democratic societies than for 
those transformed by liberal capitalism (VIII). A brief conclusion wraps up the main propositions 
and findings and call for further researches. 
I. ACCUMULATION OF WEALTH VERSUS ACCUMULATION OF POWER:  
TWO CONTRASTED LOGICS… 
As democracy is a form of organization of the political arena whereas capitalism is generally 
defined as an economic regime, any analysis of their relations calls for a clear definition of the 
nature of polity and economy. Within a political economic approach, one is tempted by a quite 
holistic definition. On one side in the political sphere, the actors struggle for the conquest and 
exercise of power. On the other side in the economy, agents play the game of exchange and 
production and in a capitalist economy this implies the accumulation of wealth by enterprises and 
individuals (Théret, 1992). 
 
But this conceptual distinction is the outcome of a long term structural transformation of 
societies and its reflection in modern social sciences. 
 
●  Economic history research, especially the Annales tradition (Braudel, 1979), has recurrently 
shown that markets emerge out of the innovations of merchants, traders, bankers, financiers 
in order to create organizations and institutions enhancing exchanges. In the related process 
they have to fight in order to be more and more autonomous from the princes and the local 
political authorities’ arbitrary decisions (Grief, 2006). In this first and rough analysis, 
democratic regimes are the outcome of political struggles over several centuries, whereas 
capitalist economies are the long term consequence of the inner forces that shape the various 
phases of accumulation. 
  
●  This autonomization trend manifests itself in the evolution of the doctrines and theories that aim 
at analyzing the related processes. If initially the political economy of the founding fathers 
mixes intimately economic and political factors, the progressive rise of capitalism induces the 
emergence of a new discipline torn by controversies – for instance about value and crisis 
theories – but unified by a common vision of the specificity of the economy. This is 
especially so with the emergence of marginalism and neoclassical representation of economic 
equilibrium. The triumph of rational choice theory and its export to other social sciences that 
is observed in contemporary academic research pushes a step further this intellectual primacy 
of economics and its trend towards autonomization with respect to other social sciences.  
 
This very basic framework may find some support in various other contemporary approaches. In 
response to liberalization and globalization, one observes the revival of Karl Polanyi’s vision 
about the inner trend of market logic to get disembedded from other social relations. More 
generally, the relationship between the sovereign state and the free market is quite paradoxical 
indeed. Before the market could be made free from political interference, it was necessary for 
political power to be disembedded from the rest of society and concentrated in a single agency – 
the state – so that it could then be separated from the market. There is a double movement – 
both economy and polity become specialized institutional spheres. In this sense, this is a major 
teaching of system theory when applied to more and more differentiated spheres of activities that 
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tend to interact via the exchange of information and resources (Luhman, 1995). Thus, this 
cursory analysis suggests a first hypothesis about contemporary evolutions. Do not we observe a 
symmetric autonomization: on one side, most governments and actors believe that markets are 
self regulating, on the other side, political competition tends to be concerned by typical political, 
with few references to economic organization?  
 
 Proposition 1: The contemporary trend towards an autonomization of the political game, observed in old 
democracies, might be in conformity with the very rationale of polity, i.e. accumulation of 
power, in the context of an adherence to a (naive) free market vision of the economy. 
.....THAT HAVE TO BE MADE COMPATIBLE WITHIN VIABLE SOCIO-
ECONOMIC CONFIGURATIONS 
But this vision is quite extreme and assumes that the regime of political and economic ideas 
totally shape the institutional configurations of societies. By contrast, historical evidence shows 
that, de facto, even if political and economic rationales are distinct, the configurations they are 
embedded into have to be compatible or even in some instances complementary. Basically, the 
political sphere needs resources extracted from economic activity and conversely economic 
actors only prosper given an institutional and legal order governing their transactions and 
relations. This theme is a major dividing line in the history of economic doctrines: “Contrary to 
the exaggerated claims of Adam’s fallacy, market capitalism is not a stable self-regulating system. 
Just as it requires conscious political effort to foster the institutions necessary to make it function 
at all, it requires continuing political and regulatory interventions to keep the pursuit of self-
interest from running of the rails.” (Foley, 2006: 224).  
 
Actually, historical investigations confirm this co-evolution of political organization and 
economic institutions. Researches inspired by Régulation Theory exhibit the succession of a series 
of such political and economic regimes (Théret, 1992; 1999). They are not necessary viable since 
the related political and economic configurations might turn to be incompatible: they then induce 
structural crises, stagnation and recurring social conflicts. Viable regimes are the unintended 
outcome of trial and error processes in order to adjust mutually the polity and the economy. This 
framework helps to understand simultaneously the existence of well behaved political economic 
regimes as well as structural crises and periods of flux in societies. 
 
Consequently, the contemporary configurations are the outcomes of a long term process of 
permanent adjustment and they manifest a significant path dependency (figure 1). 
  
• In currently industrialized economies, the State interventions have been closely related to the 
nature of the accumulation regime, even if they are not totally determined by pure economic 
mechanisms. Public interventions have constantly evolved in reaction to structural crises. For 
instance, in the Fordist regime, the extension of welfare and progressive taxation has been the 
expression of a very specific compromise between State and citizens. Democratic political 
institutions have been quite crucial in the implementation of such a regime. 
 
• By contrast, rentier economies exhibit quite different political and economic regimes. First of all, 
the State can prosper from the appropriation and redistribution of a fraction of the rent to 
various clienteles, which tends to down-play the democratic consent of citizens to pay taxes 
as a qui pro quo for a form of control of State policies. Second, rentier regimes call for very   
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Figure 1 – Differentiated but interdependent economic and political spheres and their joint development 
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distinctive institutional forms and régulation modes, where by the management of the rent 
permeates the monetary regime, the tax system, the nature of the insertion into the world 
economy. 
 
Therefore, the broad taxonomy of economic regimes derived from régulation theory shows a 
surprising similarity with a political and historical approach of the factors that shape democracy 
and democratization (Tilly, 2007). 
 
 
 Proposition 2:  Democracy is more difficult in rentier regimes, where the State can easily appropriate 
the rents, than in typical capitalist regimes, where the governments have to negotiate 
with citizens to extract taxes and legitimacy. 
.....THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS FOR THE VIABILITY OF A SELF 
INTEREST ECONOMY 
The most popular paradigm in economics is a follow up of the invisible hand story, back to 
Adam Smith who imagined that the self-interest and the natural propensity to exchange would be 
sufficient to implement a market economy reconciling individual autonomy with society wide 
coherence. A significant part of academic research in economics is trying to show that the 
principle or rationality and individual calculus should be sufficient in order to promote the 
emergence of quite all the institutions shaping market economies. But recurrently, crises, 
stagnation and open conflicts upon economic governance show, quite on the contrary, that 
collective action is absolutely necessary for the implementation of any simple market. Similarly, 
historical record, as well as sociological analyses argue, that private contract, economic rationality 
and markets presuppose the institution of basic legal forms. Furthermore since the 19th century, 
the Nation-state is the normal locus of economic activity and this assumes a preexisting 
community (Marglin, 2008, p. 191). Briefly stated the paradox of modern societies is clear: they 
require holistic foundations for typically individualistic behaviors to prosper. 
 
Proposition 3:  As soon as a Nation is conceived as a community, and not as a collection of self-interested 
individuals, polity and economy are structurally intertwined.  
 
Contemporary examples of such an embeddedness of market relations abound. For instance, 
financiers have been privately designing many financial innovations, such as energy derivatives, 
creative accounting, Initial Public Offer of start-ups of the new economy, securitization, and 
finally sub prime loans. In quite all cases, they have been so successful that they have triggered a 
macroeconomic boom that ended up into vibrant speculation and a financial crisis. In order to 
restore the viability of the related markets, public authorities have been constrained, whatever 
their free market or interventionist ideology, to design new rules of the game in order to restore 
the long run viability of market relations: the Sarbanes-Oxley Law, the bailing out of Bear Stearns 
and planned reform of the mortgage credit are good examples of such public interventions. 
Therefore the financial markets themselves that are supposed to be the most refined expression 
of rationality and pure market mechanisms cannot function without the surveillance authorities, 
and when they fail, the State has to intervene directly in order to re-open the distressed markets. 
 
Such a interweaving of economy and polity is a quite general property of really existing 
economies. During a first phase, in reaction to citizens’ demand the politicians are building 
governmental coalitions that implement new rules of the game and orient strategic choices. This 
opens a second phase when the related constraints and incentives (North, 1990) progressively 
 6
permeate into the behavior of economic actors. In democratic societies, citizens may support or 
not the present government according to their ideological preferences and the consequence of 
past policies upon their economic status and welfare. This initiates a new retroaction from the 
economy to the polity. Basically, this is one of the mechanisms that sets into motion modern 
democratic and capitalist societies (figure 2)   
Figure 2 – The interactions between the political and economic spheres 
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ECONOMY: 
 
Proposition 4:  The interactions between polity and economy explain both the evolutions of modern societies 
and the variety of their socioeconomic regimes 
II. DEMOCRACY IS NOT A SINGLE AND PERFECT POLITICAL 
REGIME…. 
There is not any generally agreed definition of democracy, precisely because it supposes a 
complex web of procedures, organizations and institutions (Tilly, 2007). Some authors propose a 
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constitutional approach of democracy that focuses on laws governing political activity. Other 
scholars concentrate upon the substantive consequences of democracy on the conditions of life 
associated to a political regime, in terms of welfare, individual freedoms, security, equity, social 
equality…. A more restricted approach focuses upon a procedural definition of the rules that may 
qualify a political regime as democratic: for instance, the organization of competitive election, the 
extent of electorate, the possibility of referenda, the existence of a multiparty political 
system…and so on. A fourth vision stresses a process oriented analysis of democracy by pointing out 
the minimum set of processes that are at the core of a democracy: effective participation, voting 
equality, enlightened understanding of each member of the community, control by them of the 
agenda, inclusion of all adult population. 
 
It is clear that combining all these approaches might define a very large variety of assessments of 
the extent of democracy for the same society at a given historical period. Let us follow Charles 
Tilly in search for a core definition of democracy. The social scientists have to “judge conformity 
of a State’s behavior to his citizens’ expressed demand: how wide a range of citizens’ expressed 
demands come into play; how equally different groups of citizens experience a translation of their 
demands into state behavior; to what extend the expression of demands itself receives the state’s 
political protection; and how much the process of translation commits both sides, citizens and 
state.” (Tilly, 2007: 13). Hence a simplified and general definition:  
 
“A regime is democratic to the degree that political relations between the State and its citizens feature broad, equal 
protected and mutually binding consultation.” (ibidem: 13-14). 
 
This general definition has to be complemented by another feature concerning the ability of the 
State to enforce its political decisions. Taking into account, this variable explain why some legally 
democratic regimes are actually unable to enforce the related order due to the weakness of State 
capacity. On the contrary, some Nation-State may exhibit a high capacity of State but weak 
democracy principles. Ideally, the more relevant democracies combine high State capacity along 
with a complete range of democratic processes. This new variable is introduced into figure 2: 
democratic principles relate to the translation of citizens’ demand into the political sphere, 
whereas State capacity measures the effectiveness of the impact of political decisions upon 
societal and economic organizations.  
 
Therefore democracy concerns the quality and density of the mutual relationships between the 
political arena and civil society. In the same line of thought, how to define social democracy? 
Basically, it can be conceived as the extension to the economic domain of the democratic 
principles: concern for equality and voice within production, access to the State by social 
partners, and finally, legitimacy of State intervention in the economy by its fairness and 
effectiveness (figure 3). 
 
Basically, a social democratic regime can be defined as: 
  
The high degree of political relations between the State and the citizens also concern welfare, firm organization and 
major social issues 
 
More precisely, this means that: 
 
• The welfare system is universal and financed by general taxation and not by social contributions 
by wage earners. 
 
•  The democratic ideal is extended to firms’ organization, under the term industrial democracy. 
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• The redesign of economic and social institutions and the design of new ones imply the 
consultation and negotiation among all the relevant collective actors (business’ associations, unions, 
citizens’ associations, public administrations). 
  
Figure 3 – From democracy to social democracy 
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But of course, social democracy is only one of the many configurations observed in history and 
comparative analyses, and it seems to characterize mainly small open economies exhibiting a 
strong communitarian legacy extended from the local to the national level.  
….AND IT IS THE OUTCOME OF A PROCESS OF DEMOCRATIZATION / 
DE-DEMOCRATIZATION 
The direct consequence of the complexity of democratic regimes is that they cannot be 
implemented at short notice, nor be imported as such from one country to another. The labor of 
history is determinant in understanding the permanent process of re-composition of political 
institutions. Furthermore, the superiority of any democratic configuration is quite difficult to 
assess, therefore no constraining force guides the political system toward a more and more 
complete democratization. If one dares to build a synthetic index of democratization, just to give 
a sketchy vision of long term evolutions, one is surprised to observe the succession of progress 
and regression of democratic principles (Tilly, 2007: 35, for instance). Nevertheless, across 
centuries seems to prevail a general trend in favor of the improvement of democratization and 
State capacity to implement these principles (figure 4). 
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Figure 4 – The Trajectory of French democracy 
 
Source: Tilly Ch. (2007: 35) 
 
Any such evolution is country specific and consequently the naïve idea of democracy as a once 
for all movement in the direction of citizens’ voice is falsified by many historical evidences. 
Forces of democratization and countervailing factors of reversal toward authoritarian regimes 
alternate according a quite complex process. Basically, the same statement can be made 
concerning the implementation of market mechanisms: they never derive from once for all big 
bang, since the inner trends they trigger tend to develop obstacles and struggles against their 
generalization (Polanyi, 1944). 
 
 
Proposition 5:  Democratization is a long term and uneven process, featuring progress and regress periods. 
III. A VARIETY OF CAPITALISMS WITH DISTINCTIVE REGULATION 
MODES…. 
Capitalism is everywhere in contemporary world, but it is not an easy task to propose any general 
and common definition, and this difficulty is quite similar to those experienced when searching 
for the meaning and content of democracy. Some authors point out that capitalism is basically 
grounded on private property, others prefer to stress the role of open competition on markets 
still others diagnose its consequences upon technical change and social inequalities. Let us risk a 
synthetic definition:  
 
Capitalism is a socioeconomic regime in which the distribution of power in production, and by extension in society, 
is closely related to the position of actors with respect to market relations on one side, production relations on the 
other. 
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One major consequence of this definition is that power is not any more limited to the political 
sphere but it concerns too and more importantly the economic sphere by the way of 
concentration of property rights and asymmetric relations between entrepreneurs and wage-
earners. Symmetrically, it means that some of its major institutional forms originate in the 
political sphere: labor laws, enforcement of competition, organization of the financial system, 
political and economic diplomacy, not to speak about the core of polity, i.e. the relations between 
State and citizens. If contrary to vulgar Marxism, economic relations do not totally determine 
political relations then the intricacy of the expression of political power may have clear 
consequences upon the functioning of the economy.  
 
Given the idiosyncrasies of social, political and economic struggles, typical of each society, many 
brands of capitalism emerged from the commercial and then industrial revolutions and they 
continue to coexist in contemporary world, in spite (actually because) of the so-called 
globalization. Let us summarize the converging findings of researches upon the variety of 
capitalisms (Amable & al., 1997; Chavance & al., 1999; Aoki, 2000; Hall and Soskice, 2001; 
Amable, 2003; Boyer, 2004b). At least, four brands of capitalism derive from contrasted 
institutionalization of typical social relations of this socioeconomic regime (table 1), and the list 
could be extended considering former communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe, 
China, India, Brazil. 
 
• The market-led capitalism is built upon the domination of market mechanisms in quite all 
spheres of the related societies. But since competition on free markets leads to collusion, 
oligopoly or monopoly, periodically public authorities have to intervene in opening again the 
market via the enforcement of fair competition. The ideal of market competition is present, 
not only on product, credit and labour market, but also in the organization of research, the 
governance of welfare, and of course the organization of pension funds. Still more, some 
analysts stress the symmetry between the vote of the consumers and the choice of citizens during 
the electoral competition on the political market. Not to speak about the role of financial 
support in electoral campaigns. In this brand of capitalism, the leading institutional form is 
competition, even if it might shift from product to financial markets since the 80s. 
Contemporary US and to some extent UK are key examples of this configuration. 
 
• The meso-corporatist capitalism is extending traditional community ties from the family and the 
locality to the large conglomerate corporation. This is the cohesive factor that explains the 
nature of employment contract that codifies long term relations with a given company, the 
nature of competition among keiretsu or chaebols, and even the relations of top-managers with 
State officials. The democratic process is not seen as a market for ideas and politicians but 
quite on the contrary as the preservation of long term ties at the local and national levels. A 
sophisticated form of clientelism is permeating the whole society, including during the 
electoral process and government deliberations. In any case, the core actor is thus the large 
corporation, and market competition is not the key driving force. Japan and South Korea are 
typical of this meso-corporatist capitalism and they exhibit a quite significant divergence with 
respect with American or English type of capitalism. 
 
• The State-led capitalism is still another configuration, where the intermediation of the State is 
present in the organization and functioning of quite any institutional forms. The labor market 
is highly regulated by the State (minimum wage, legal duration of work, legal restriction upon 
hiring and firing…). Until the last two decades, the financial market was also highly 
controlled via specific laws and even nationalized commercial banks. In the productive sector, 
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Table 1 – Régulation theory findings (RT): at least four institutional architectures 
 Régulation 
    
  
Market-led Meso-Corporatist
 
 State-led Social Democratic
 1. Overall logic and hierarchical principle
 Market logic is the organizing principle 
of almost all institutional forms. 
The principle of sharing and mobility 
lies at the heart of an economic unit 
that is large in size and diversified in 
production. 
 
Economic activity shaped by public 
interventions in the areas of production, 
demand and institutional codification. 
Rules governing most of the elements 
of society and of the economy are 
negotiated between social partners. 
2. Implication for institutional forms:    
 Wage 
 relations 
Broad decentralization of wage 
negotiations, individualized 
remuneration and segmentation of the 
labor market. 
Wage bargaining within major firms but 
synchronized wage increases. 
Tendency towards strong 
institutionalization of rules in the areas 
of employment, working time, wages 
and social protection. 
Traditionally, centralized collective 
bargaining, constrained by short- and 
medium-term competitiveness. 
 Competition Limiting concentration by legislation, 
with one oligopoly reforming into 
another. 
Relatively intense on the market in 
goods between large firms present on a 
large number of markets. 
Moderated, since channeled through 
public regulations or by professional 
associations, strong concentration of 
capital. 
Small number of large firms: strongly 
internationalized, however, therefore 
subject to competition. 
 Money and 
 finance 
Independence of the central bank, 
financial market logic, increases in the 
number of financial innovations, strong 
control of firms through finance. 
Role of the main bank and of keiretsu in 
financing and allocation of capital. 
Strong control by public authorities 
(Treasury, central bank). 
Credit and monetary policy strongly 
controlled by the state. Traditionally, 
weak autonomy of the central bank, 
determining role of the Treasury. 
Mainly bank financing, with monetary 
policy supporting the objective of full 
employment and only then of 
competitiveness 
 The state Fragmented into a series of agencies 
and supervisory authorities, the state is 
strongly limited by competition on the 
political market. 
Ensures the provision of collective 
services and co-ordination which 
cannot be fulfilled by large firms. Small 
size but significant role. 
Strong quantitative and qualitative 
development of public interventions: 
nationalized enterprises, regulations, 
public expenditure, social protection 
etc. 
Multitude of public interventions in the 
form of financial transfers and 
extensive, restrictive regulations. 
 International 
 integration 
Adheres to the principles of free trade, 
greater or lesser autonomy according to 
status and size (differences between the 
US and the UK). 
Choices in the matter of trade and 
finance are conditioned by the 
imperative of technological and 
economic development. 
 
Traditionally strong state control of 
external relations (tariffs, standards, 
quotas, restrictions on financial flows). 
Acceptance of principle of 
competitiveness through technological 
and organizational innovation. 
3. Characteristics of mode of régulation   
 Very broadly, market-led régulation, 
under the control of sophisticated legal 
mechanisms. 
Adjustments at the meso-economic 
level of the large firm; state and market 
have a secondary role. 
 
The state is at the centre of macro-
economic adjustments; markets and 
firms adapt to its rules of the game. 
 
Tripartite negotiation (employers-
unions-state) at the heart of institutional 
forms. 
4. Typical examples  
 
 
 
• US economy in the 80s 
• UK after Thatcher to some extent 
• US in the epoch of Henry Ford 
• Japan after 1945 and until 1991 
• South Korea before 1997 
• France in the Golden-age 
• Germany at the level of Länder 
• Possibly developmentist State in 
Latin America 
• Scandinavian countries after 1945, 
Sweden, Denmark, Finland 
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traditionally, the State is very present via extensive regulation and/or control of competition 
and again the presence of nationalized firms even in the sector exposed to foreign 
competition. The conception of democracy is itself quite dependent from the omnipresent 
role of the State: public administration is perceived as the tutor of citizens and the vector of democracy. 
Any social conflict, economic disequilibria or financial trouble is shifted from the direct 
responsibility of actors to State responsibility, perceived as an insurer of last resort. France is 
a key example of this capitalism, but Germany displays equivalent principles at the level of 
each länder. 
 
• Social democratic capitalism is the consequence of the permanent consultation and negotiation of 
collective actors in the organization and re-organization of institutional forms. In this model, 
the voice of citizens – directly via election or indirectly via a dense organization of civil 
society – is replacing the exit mechanism that is typical of market-led capitalism. The 
involvement of quite all social actors brings a significant stability of political compromises, i.e. 
of the expectations governing economic decisions. Since most of the related societies are 
quite small, representative democracy is easily complemented by various forms of direct democracy. It 
is probably in these countries that the gap between citizens and politicians is the smaller. 
Scandinavian countries are emblematic of this fourth configuration. 
 
 
Proposition 6:  The very core institutional forms of a capitalist economy (the monetary regime, the insertion 
into the world economy, the labor institutions) originate from the political sphere. 
Nevertheless, their compatibility is up to a search trial and error process. This is the origin 
of long term evolution and the persisting diversity of capitalist economies. 
….AGAINST THE BELIEF OF A ONE BEST WAY 
Given this diversity, one may ask which of these capitalisms deliver superior outcomes. Actually, 
conventional economic theory is obsessed by the issue of economic efficiency, Pareto optima, 
whereas managerial literature – that has invaded public management – is desperately looking for 
one best way organizations. Even the European Union is looking for best practices in economic 
and social policies, via the so-called Open Method of Coordination (OMC). Such a quest is not 
necessarily relevant (table 2).  
 
• In strict economic terms, there is no natural synthetic index of economic performance, let it be 
proximity to full employment, level of standard of living, level or increase of total factor 
productivity or rate of returns on equity… 
 
• The choice of a performance index is function of the implicit or explicit objectives that are 
associated to a political coalition. For a developmentist State, the growth rate may capture the 
main objective pursued but within social democratic capitalism, the preservation of social 
justice is a preferred and quite different objective. A finance-led capitalism measures its 
success by the progression of total financial wealth, whereas a meso-corporatist one will 
privilege the stability of long term trust and loyalty relations, possibly at the cost of poor 
macroeconomic performance, as experienced by the Japanese lost decade.  
 
• Even assuming that a given brand of capitalism is Pareto superior to any other (more growth, 
better employment, more profits, more equality…), comparative historical analyses show that 
there is no single case of a pure and perfect imitation of a given successful form of capitalism. In all 
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Table 2 – Strengths and weaknesses of the various modes of régulation 
 
 Régulation 
    Market-led Meso-Corporatist State-led Social Democratic
Conditions 
permitting this 
mode 
• Sufficient level of development 
• Broad decentralization of 
research and economic activity 
• Efficient general education 
system 
• Existence of large multi-product 
firms 
• Objective: economic and 
technological catch-up 
• Accepting and legitimizing 
multiple forms of intervention 
on the part of the state 
• Accepting the principle of 
openness and competitiveness 
• Values of solidarity and social 
justice 
Strengths • Specialization in codifiable 
knowledge 
• Rapid response to structural 
change 
• Capacity for radical innovation 
• Specialization in activities where 
localized learning predominates 
• Cumulative nature of the effects 
of experience 
• Advantages for incremental 
innovations 
• Specialization in activities linked 
to collective needs (transport, 
health, telecommunications) 
• Favors catch-up 
• Major long-term programs open 
to radical innovations 
• Specialization in activities linked 
to natural resources and welfare 
• Lower levels of inequality 
• Pressure to adopt new 
techniques in high technology 
sectors 
Weaknesses • Under-investment in collective 
elements 
• Possible growth of inequalities 
• Short-termism in decision-
making 
• Under-investment in 
fundamental research 
• Possible delays in reacting to 
economic circumstances 
• Relatively lax control over 
investment decisions 
• Under-investment in product 
innovations which satisfy 
consumer needs 
• Slowness in adapting public 
interventions 
• High taxation, potentially 
dissuasive of investment and RD 
 
• Inadequacy of financial system 
Sources of 
destabilization 
• Reduction of expenditure and 
public subsidy to education and 
research 
• Incapable of creating the co-
ordination needed for certain 
branches of industry 
• Paradigm shift in production 
towards sectors linked to science 
• Destabilization by financial 
deregulation 
• Advances at the technological 
frontier call for  other  forms of 
organization 
• Constraints on economic policy 
block the stimulating role of the 
state 
• Divergence from international 
trends 
• Destabilization through 
internationalization and financial 
deregulation 
 
Source: Amable, Barré, and Boyer [1997: 194-195] 
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cases, a process of hybridization takes place and ends up in a genuine and different brand of 
capitalism. Let us remember the German or French trajectory compared with England during 
the first industrial revolution or the strong differentiation of mass production after Second 
World War, respectively in the United States, Europe, and Japan. What about the probability 
of China to converge towards a typical American capitalism? A priori nil or very small indeed! 
 
Looking at the comparative merits and limits of the four capitalisms, it is quite evident that these 
arguments are quite relevant: the criteria of success vary from one brand to another. Even if the 
social democratic model were perceived as the best mix between dynamic efficiency and social 
justice by a social scientist, could any American politician convince citizens to accept the related 
increase of taxation and social contribution?  
IV. LIBERALISM IS A MULTIFACETED DOCTRINE…. 
There is a lot of confusion about the mutual relations between liberalism and democracy on one 
side, liberalism and capitalism on the other side. In the 19th century, political liberalism was 
distinguished from democracy but nowadays liberalism tends to be associated with democracy. 
Past national experiences during the 20th century have allied economic liberalism with quite 
authoritarian, un-democratic political regimes. Furthermore, political and ideological debates 
frequently confuse liberalism and capitalism as synonyms, a quite strange conception indeed. If 
capitalism is an existing socio-political regime, economic liberalism is a doctrine or a theory that 
is supposed to be legitimating a precise form of free market capitalism. Has the emergence of 
liberalism been the key factor in the constitution of capitalist economies? One may have some 
doubts on several grounds.  
 
• First, Adam Smith, David Ricardo and others were building doctrines and theories and not at 
all directly the institutions of capitalism. Political economic theories have no performativity 
by themselves, even though they might inspire some economic and political actors. 
 
• Second, who were the real architects of contemporary capitalisms? Economic and social 
history suggests that capitalist organizations emerged out of the inventiveness, the struggles 
and the competences of the actors themselves: the merchants, the traders, the changers, the 
bankers, the entrepreneurs, the inventors, the engineers, the financiers, the accountants, the 
lawyers and even the political elite of merchants’ cities. 
 
• Third, one may consider that the progressive rise of economists, as professionals, brings the 
final touch to this complex co-evolution of market, industrial and financial innovations on 
one side, economic analyses and theories on the other side. 
 
A second issue relates to the duality of liberalism, as a supposed unified doctrine. For economists, 
liberalism recommends to organize the economy according to the free functioning of markets. 
Economic liberalism is thus totally opposed to interventionism. For political scientists, this is a 
principle for organizing the relations between the State and citizens in the direction of the 
empowerment of individuals in reaction to the rest of concentration of political power. Political 
liberalism is the antidote to the doctrine justifying the monopolization of power. 
 
Generally, these two components of liberalism are assumed to be strictly complementary: without 
political liberalism no successful economic liberalism and conversely the task of political 
liberalism is to promote and institute economic liberalism. Again, comparative and historical 
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evidences contradict the generality of this association, actually observed in many English speaking 
countries (table 3). Furthermore, from a pure semantic point of view and to add to the confusion, 
in the USA “liberal” trends to mean “left”, and therefore can include hostility to free markets! 
 
• One finds in Latin-America many instances of dictatorial regimes, that destroyed democracy but 
that have been using the strong State capacity to promote free market capitalism. In the case of 
Chile, this strategy has finally been successful, anticipating in many domains the policy of 
conservative governments in old democracies. Contemporary China is another example of 
quasi complementarity between an authoritarian political regime and the promotion and 
extension of a typical capitalist logic. 
 
• A more conventional association is mixing an authoritarian military regime along with 
interventionism, i.e. a strong and heavy public hand in the organization of economic activity, via 
the channeling of credit, the manipulation of external tariff, the coordination of strategies by 
an omnipotent public administration. One could recognize the South Korean configuration 
until 1985. 
 
• A last configuration associates a rather extended democratization in the political sphere along 
with a clear distrust about the efficiency and legitimacy of pure market mechanism 
allocations. This was the case for many mixed economies after de Second World War and until 
the 60s (Shonfield, 1965): France was a good example of the merits of this original 
intertwining of political liberalism and strong economic interventionism. 
Table 3 – The multiple configurations of liberalism in history 
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Proposition 7:  The historical evidence invalidates the hypothesis of a structural complementarity between 
political and economic liberalism 
…..AND CAPITALISM IS A SOCIOECONOMIC REGIME… 
A brief survey concerning the relations between capitalism and its representations and theorizing 
suggests an equivalent complexity. Naturally, it is tempting to closely associate the theories and 
doctrines to socioeconomic regimes: is not Adam Smith frequently considered not only the 
 16
founding father of political economy but also the reference and tutor of the emergence of 
industrial capitalism? Are not some analysts closely associating neo-liberalism, neoclassical theory 
deregulation and contemporary competition led capitalism?  Symmetrically, socialism is perceived 
as the opposite socioeconomic regime: the political organization is based upon the concentration 
of power within a single party, the economic transactions are centrally planned, and Marxism is 
supposed to be the relevant theory/ideology. 
 
But two other configurations manifest that this black and white picture does not capture the 
diversity of the links between ideas and socioeconomic regimes (table 4):  
  
• Is liberalism a necessary ingredient in the building of a capitalist Nation-State? Clearly few if 
any national economies have replicated the British strategy that relied so much to laissez faire 
principles domestically and abroad, but mitigated by the clever use of the empire to support 
the domestic economy. France, Germany, Japan have adopted a different route and they 
massively used public interventions in the name of the defense of infant industries (List 
1841). Similarly the industrialization of larger Latin American countries was based on a strong 
impulse by the State in order to overcome the obstacles of their dependence from the 
specialization on primary commodities exports. Last but not least, South Asian tigers, China 
and India are building their strategies upon the multiple interventions of a developmentist 
State: their present good performance is not at all associated to naïve reliance upon the 
invisible hand.  
 
• During the interwar, some theoreticians have proposed a quite daring conception of socialism: 
if capitalism lead to collusion, concentration and monopoly, the task of a socialist 
government should be to restore free competition in order to maximize the welfare of the society 
.In a sense the concentration of political power could obtain the outcome aimed at by 
economic liberalism (Lange and Taylor, 1938). Some of the reformers of the Soviet economic 
system in the 60s were imagining that powerful computers could allow the central planning to 
get an unprecedented efficiency in the allocation of labor and resources, i.e. to beat capitalism 
at its own game. It was a kind of tribute to the two welfare theorems: planning could deliver 
that the really existing markets were unable to do! 
Table 4 – The complex relations between liberalism and capitalism in social theories 
 SOCIO-ECONOMIC REGIMES 
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Proposition 8:  The adhesion to economic liberalism is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for the 
building of a capitalist economy, since interventionism has proven quite instrumental for late 
comers.  
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…..IN PERMANENT TRANSFORMATION 
The previous examples point out one of the key features of capitalist regimes, i.e. their capacity to 
transform themselves in reaction to social struggles, major crises and political regime changes. 
This is not a surprise since according to the Marxist analysis this mode of production really sets 
into motion the history of mankind by periodically altering the configuration of the capital/labor 
relation, the nature of competition, the geographical extension of markets and even 
organizations, technologies and lifestyles. Emerging out of the decomposition of feudalist 
regimes, capitalism was so dynamic and contradictory that it was expected by Karl Marx to 
engender the very collective forms of organizations that would unfold into its demise and 
replacement by socialism and ultimately communism. 
 
This prognosis has been refuted on many grounds: 
 
•  The communist revolution has taken place not in the most advanced capitalist societies, i.e. 
England, but within a lagging and quasi feodalist society such as Russia. The soviet regime 
was supposed to overcome the capitalism in terms of economic performance if not 
democratic principles. Its collapse in 1989 is thus a benchmark in the so called competition of 
economic and political systems. 
 
•  Symmetrically, the various capitalisms have drastically been changed via the succession of 
economic and financial crises, social and political conflicts and the geographical diffusion of 
market relations. For instance, at odds with the prognosis of the formation of a vast 
proletariat, the social division of labor has generated a growing middle class and this has 
largely mitigated the trends towards social inequality. This was supposed to slowdown the 
dynamism of innovation (Schumpeter, 1942) and that prognosis has not been confirmed by 
post-WWII evolutions. At the level of the mode of production, the mixing of public 
institutions and private organizations has converged towards various forms of a mixed 
capitalism (Shonfield, 1965). 
     
• But the very success of this new regime generates adverse trends that unfold into the crisis 
the Golden Age. Frequently it is interpreted as the limit of public intervention in the 
economy due to the opening domestic economies and an unprecedented internationalization 
that challenges the degree of autonomy of national policies. Back to the early 90s, this demise 
of the post WWII order was supposed to open a new epoch featuring the smooth and easy 
diffusion of a canonical model based on two pillars: markets for the organization of 
economic activity, and representative democracy in the political sphere. Liberal capitalism was 
supposed to represent this common economic and political regime (Fukuyama, 1992).  
 
Nowadays this convergence hypothesis has been significantly reassessed since for old 
democracies at least three conceptions still coexist (figure 5): 
 
•  Liberal Capitalism continues to be seen as the benchmark but recent events have mitigated its 
appeal. Its export has proven quite problematic, especially when implemented by foreign 
intervention and in the context of a complete destruction of State capacity (Fukuyama, 2004). 
Furthermore, liberal capitalism exhibits flexibility and a large capacity to innovate but at the 
cost of rising inequalities and financial instability.  
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Figure 5 – The historical evolution of political and economic regimes: A bird’s eyes view  
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•  Most social democratic societies experienced a crisis and significant restructuring during the 80s or 
90s. But far from converging towards a typical liberal economy where coordination is let to 
market mechanisms (Hall and Soskice, 2001), they have been successful in redesigning their 
welfare, tax system and public sector while preserving the objective of social justice. The New 
Social Democracy is therefore reconciling efficiency along with solidarity in the context of a 
large opening to the world economy and the insertion into the knowledge based productive 
paradigm (Boyer, 2004b).  
   
• Social Liberalism is a third political agenda in many other European societies where the 
weakness of collective actors and their recurring conflicts and mutual distrust do not allow 
them to go along the typical social democratic route of permanent negotiation of new 
compromises . The core objective is to prepare the individuals to exploit the opportunities of 
the market and accept the related constraints in terms of mobility, flexibility, remuneration, 
and lean welfare. This has been theorized under the label of Third Way (Giddens, 1998). De 
facto but not de jure, in Europe, it is a source of inspiration both for some socialist and many 
right wing politicians. The promotion of economic liberalism goes along with the 
implementation of a minimalist safety net via targeted welfare interventions.      
        
 
Proposition 9:  In a sense, the Third Way is an updating for social-democracy of the Lange/Taylor 
proposal about market socialism: polity has to promote the adhesion to a free market 
economy.  
 
V. A CONJECTURE: THE INSERTION OF KEY SOCIO-ECONOMIC 
GROUPS INTO THE POLITICAL PROCESS HELPS IN STABILIZING 
LONG TERM GROWTH… 
Before coming back to the discussion of the exact content of these political programs, it might 
useful to remind some of the main findings delivered by previous régulationist research concerning 
some possible links between democratization and economic performance.  
 
• The alliance between managers and wage earners leads to an unprecedented growth 
regime: 1945-1966   
 
After World War II, wage-earners became the majority of the working population but it was not 
a sufficient condition for the emergence of the new Fordist growth regime. Already during the 
interwar period, this social group was the majority but it was collectively unable to  alter the 
highly competitive pattern of wage formation. This has proven to be an obstacle to the viability 
of mass production since, it was not synchronized, with an equivalent mass-consumption 
originating from wage-earners. After WWII quite on the contrary, the institutionalization of wage 
indexing upon consumer price and productivity has promoted the viability of an unprecedented 
growth regime that was reconciling stable and high profit along with the progression of living 
standard of quite all wage earners. In a sense, this new institutionalized power of workers in the 
economic sphere was the consequence of the democratization of political life. Clearly, this process 
has been quite favorable to the dynamism and stability of growth. The related Fordist 
compromise was the consequence of a significant democratization process under the challenge 
that represented at that time the Soviet regime (figure 6). 
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Figure 6 - The 60’s. The first configuration of actors: the Fordist compromise 
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•  From wage-earners to consumers, the first step of the conservative back 
lash: 1967-1985 
The very success of the mobilization of increasing returns to scale, typical of mass-production, 
has triggered the surge of international trade in order to continue to reap the related benefits at a 
larger geographical scale. But then, the wage-led demand regime has progressively been replaced 
by an export i.e. profit-led demand, and this economic structural change has progressively eroded 
the basis of the Fordist compromise. In order to cope with foreign competition, firms and 
governments have pointed out the necessity of wage moderation, productivity increases and 
better product quality. Wage moderation policies are adopted and the Fordist wage formula is 
abandoned: the unemployment is eroding the bargaining power of workers and under the threat 
of plant closures the managers obtain wage concession, higher labor intensity and the adoption of 
new methods in order to promote quality, perceived as a decisive factor in international 
competition along with unit costs (figure 7). 
Figure 7 - The 80’s. The second configuration of actors: An international competition led regime 
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Basically, the managers use domestic consumers as well as foreign demands in order to discipline 
wage-earners. De facto and ultimately de jure, the past national compromises are progressively 
replaced by a series of micro-corporatist arrangements at the firm level that imply various forms 
of concession bargaining. This is a turning point with the original aim of collective bargaining and 
of neo-corporatism that was to protect improvements in workers’ wages and conditions from 
high levels of competition among firms. Thus, firm-level industrial relations immediately destroy 
an important component of both collective bargaining and neo-corporatism. In order to defend 
the opening to the world economy, business and governments stress the positive role of price 
moderation upon standard of living, since nominal wage has been de-indexed from consumer 
prices. Thus, the consumer tends to replace the wage earners as the key targeted group of 
economic policy via price competition and wage moderation. Ultimately, the same process takes 
place concerning the organization of collective goods and public services: the citizens are 
considered as clients and consumers and this is one of the bases of the conservative counter 
revolution from Margaret Thatcher to Tony Blair (Faucher-King and Le Galès, 2007: 179).  
      
•  The exclusion of wage earners triggers a finance led regime, quite 
unequal and unstable: 1986-2008  
But the deregulation of product and labor markets was also associated to financial opening, 
deregulation and innovation, i.e. a structural move that turns out to have drastic consequences. In 
the name of shareholder value, the top managers of quoted large public companies have allied 
with financiers both in order to shift a larger fraction of risk upon wage-earners and then stabilize 
the rate of return on equities and to share a fraction of capital gains via stock options and various 
other mechanisms. Symmetrically, in the US for instance, the welfare has been more and more 
privatized and pay as you go systems have been replaced by pension funds (Montagne, 2006). 
After two decades, this financialization has directly affected macroeconomic evolutions and even 
permeated wage earners remunerations (figure 8). De facto, the wage-earners are excluded from 
the previous alliance at the level of the firm, but at the political level too, as evidenced, for 
instance in the US, by the domination of republicans at the detriment of the democrats that were 
traditionally allied of the workers movements. Furthermore, the new financial regime is 
essentially international whereas political deliberation and democracy are stuck at the level of 
National State, at the possible exception of the European Union, as an embryonic federal State in 
search for democratic legitimacy. 
Figure 8 - The 90’s. The third configuration of actors: the alliance of investors and managers 
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This exclusion of the larger social group of wage earners is an evidence for de-democratization 
and the macroeconomic outcomes have been disappointing compared with the expectations 
generated by the alliance of finance with new technologies. American growth has been quite 
moderate and finally unstable, and two major financial crises burst out respectively on 2001 and 
2007-2008. Seemingly, this is a contrario a confirmation of the following conjecture:  
 
For the democracies where wage-earners are the majority group, their voices into the political process usually favors 
macroeconomic performance. Conversely, their exclusion generally hinders long-term macroeconomic performances.     
 
•  A possible origin of the collapse of Christian democrats’ hegemony in 
Italy: the exclusion of wage earners 
This intuition derived from this retrospective and comparative analysis is confirmed by a detailed 
case study devoted to the interpretation of the collapse of the post-WWII political order in Italy 
(Palombarini, 1997; 1998; 2001). The basic idea is that wage-earners and firms bargain under the 
conditions set by the macroeconomic policy, i.e. the choice of the exchange rate regime, and the 
size of the public deficit. This choice is determined according to the political coalition that 
emerges from periodic elections. During elections, each of the three social groups (entrepreneurs, 
rentiers who live out of the interest paid on the public debt, and wage-earners) vote for parties, 
according to their ideological preferences and their degree of satisfaction related to the 
macroeconomic variables relevant for them (respectively the profit rate, the real interest rate and 
a mix of real wage and employment) (figure 9). 
 
Actually since the end of the second-World War, the distribution of political power was such that 
the Christian Democratic Party used to express the alliance of rentiers with entrepreneurs. The 
expansion of public spending and debt stimulated the demand addressed to firms and was 
increasing the income of rentiers who represent a large fraction of the population. If these two 
games – at the firm level on one side, at the national political level on the other side – are inserted 
into a macroeconomic model describing this very specific régulation mode, simulations show that 
the expansion of the debt is cumulative; therefore the interest rate paid is increasing, due to a 
growing risk premium. Up to a threshold the interests of the business and the rentiers diverge 
and the incompatibility of their strategies shifts the burden of the adjustments upon the shoulders 
of the wage-earners. Therefore the crisis is simultaneously economic and political. Of course, this 
is a drastic simplification of the Italian case, and clearly this model does pretend to exhaust the 
various possible explanations of the collapse of Christian Democrats1, but it brings a quite 
stimulating vision of the relations between polity and economy. 
 
The long lasting political exclusion of representatives of wage-earners has finally been detrimental 
to the long run viability of the strategy of the leading Christian Democrat political coalition. This 
is an argument in favor of the access of this social group to an alternative political coalition. 
 
1  As pointed out by Colin Crouch “It makes no reference to: (1) the fact that Christian Democracy had a working-
class component that had to be satisfied to some extent; (2) that both polity and economy of the Mezzogiorno 
were sustained by webs of tax evasion and corruption that eventually became a crisis because the public started to 
demand public services in exchange for the taxes that many people were not paying; (3) the impact on the post-
war political configuration of the decline of the ‘communist threat’ and of the power of the Church.” 
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Figure 9 – The exclusion of a large social group may be detrimental to the viability of an economic regime: the Italian trajectory 
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Proposition 10:  The inclusion of the majority socio-economic groups in the political process generally 
contributes to the long run viability of an economic regime 
…..POLITICAL INTERMEDIATION MATTERS 
The same research points out another proposition (Palombarini, 2001): the intricacies of political 
interventions may matter a lot for economic performance and the viability of a socioeconomic 
regime. The characteristics of the electoral process, that used to be proportional, induce a 
fragmentation of the parties, and thus some of them become pivotal for the sustainability of the 
existing political coalition. Therefore, the inner political game may periodically destabilize 
economic policy formation. Consequently, the structure of the political sphere induces the 
generalization of short termism among policy makers. This is another factor of macroeconomic 
crisis since no political actor has interest in internalizing the long term consequences of the 
economic policies they decide. 
 
Conversely, this feature may enlighten why some authoritarian regimes (in Latin-America in the 
70s and 80s, South Korea until 1985, Taiwan, and of course contemporary China) take into 
account the long term growth and stability in their decisions and consequently experience 
surprisingly good macroeconomic results, not in spite but because of the absence of democracy, 
i.e. the exclusion of the majority of the population. Therefore, a badly designed electoral system 
(Italy) or an irrelevant one with respect to the actual social cleavages of a given society (Russia 
under Gorbatchev, Iraq after Saddam Hussein) might be detrimental simultaneously to 
democratization and macroeconomic stability and performance. 
 
Proposition 11:  The very intricacies of the political process of intermediation may help or on the contrary 
hinder the objective of democratization.  
VI. 
                                                
A CONTEMPORARY PARADOX: AN EXTENSION OF 
DEMOCRATIZATION TO NEW SOCIETIES… 
With the collapse of Soviet Union regime, many observers have diagnosed a wave of 
democratization, and it actually took place in Central and Eastern Europe, to less extend in Asia 
(India is a democracy since it independence, but China is not) and finally Latin America. This 
continent is especially interesting since it was the territory of the theory and the practice of a 
developmentist State, sometimes built after a military coup2. The autocratic governments 
cancelled a series of democratic rights…but nevertheless in some instances the developmentist 
State generally triggered an economic modernization at possible large social costs (Santiso, 2007). 
The transformations of the 90s are therefore surprising. On one side, in spite of the turmoil 
associated to financial and economic crises, public opinion has been converted to the merits of 
democracy. On the other side, most Latin-American citizens do think that democracy is good for 
the development of their country (figure 10). 
 
2  This does not mean that all military regimes had interest in economic development, nor that civilian 
governments could not promote a developmentist State. 
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Figure 10 – Public opinion concerning democracy in Latin American societies  
 
Source: Percentage of responses affirming the statement “Democracy is the only political system 
that can help the development of the country” from Latinobarometro polls, in Javier Santiso 
(2007: 31) 
 
Therefore, many political scientists have devoted a lot of research in order to understand the 
factors that shape this process of democratization (see for instance, Przeworski, 1991; 2004). But 
the adhesion to democracy is far from angelic or naïve “As happened in the old democracy, the citizens’ 
dissatisfaction with respect to their leaders has increased. […] Between 1996 and 2003 satisfaction decreased 
considerably. In all countries, with the exception of Venezuela, satisfaction with democracy has receded. Above all, 
this dissatisfaction refers to the economic achievements of the democratic regime (Santiso, 2007: 
33). Clearly, complex factors shape the assessment by citizens of their government actions: on 
one side, political and ideological preferences; on the other side, appraisal of the practical 
consequences, including economic ones, for each individual of the past policies. 
…..BUT DISENCHANTMENT OF CITIZENS IN NEW AND OLD 
DEMOCRACIES 
Actually, one of the key reasons for the dissatisfaction of citizens is precisely that most 
governments have not delivered outcomes in line with their electoral promises. Therefore, this is 
a rupture with respect to the Golden Age. During this period, even conservative politicians 
declared they were Keynesians (Nixon in the US) or social democrats (Valery Giscard d’Estaing 
in France) because they wanted to appear as progressist and to be attributed the origins of an 
unprecedented economic dynamism. Conversely nowadays, citizens blame governments for poor 
macroeconomic performances even if their real responsibility is quite indirect. 
 
But beneath the surface, this disenchanted view of democratic regimes has deeper explanations 
(table 5). 
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• A frequently called upon factor is of course the impact of globalization. During the Golden 
Age, firms and wage-earners were de facto interdependent since mass-production was servicing 
the domestic market composed mainly by these wage-earners. This economic 
complementarity had a counterpart in the political sphere and this explains the remarkable 
stability of this socio-political regime. By contrast nowadays, domestic firms are responding 
to a world demand and they can invest everywhere in the world: the structural 
complementarity with the workforce has broken down. 
 
• Furthermore, the stability of the hierarchy of income among wage-earners used to 
correspond to the large division of labour exhibited by the emblematic assembly line. Today, 
the deepening of division of labour has generated a stronger individualization of competences 
(Beffa, Boyer, Touffut, 1999). Professionals (the symbolist analysts of Robert Reich) are at 
the origin of a new productive paradigm, based upon innovation, differentiation and quality of 
products and services. They are highly mobile from one job to another and they move easily 
across national borders. By contrast, flexible workers continue to suffer from low 
competences and a clear dependence with respect to the domestic market. In between, 
polyvalent workers continue to benefit from the previous compromise between managers 
and workers, since they display firm’s specific competences but their number is shrinking. 
This segmentation of workers has weakened their collective bargaining power.    
Table 5 – Risks and opportunities for a renewal of democracy 
 
RISKS OPPORTUNITIES 
1. “Globalization” entitles symbolic analysts 
to free themselves from national politics: a 
real risk 
1. Call for more democracy at the 
international level, via a reform of United 
Nation institutions: a potential opportunity
2. Rise of transnational corporation as an 
actor inaccessible to domestic democratic 
control in the era of neo-liberalism 
2. Civil society organizations develop at the 
transnational level and try to be a 
countervailing force 
3. Generation of new inequalities in the 
knowledge based economy 
3. Some social-democratic societies have 
been successful in preserving moderate 
inequalities while mastering the KBE 
4. Divorce between the higher complexity of 
modern societies and the limits of 
representative democracy 
4. Learning from failed experiments (Iraq) 
and progressive learning (Latin-America) 
re-politization of independent 
administrative entities( Europe)  
5. Crisis of political intermediation 5. Renewed interest for participatory 
democracy and other forms of democracy 
in complement to representative 
democracy 
6. The fusion of finance, media and politics 
endangers the democratic process 
6. New regulations about the civic control of 
media, finance and politicians 
 
• The increasing heterogeneity of competences, life styles, and political preferences makes political 
intermediation more and more difficult. If the mass-production / mass-consumption regime 
initially produced homogeneity, its very maturing has on the contrary generated more and 
more differentiations of status. It is therefore increasingly difficult to satisfy a majority of 
citizens, the more so the more diversified the issues at stake (employment, income, security, 
quality of life, ecology,…). 
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• Contrary to Luhman’s prognosis, we seem to observe a trend toward the mixing if not the 
fusion of three previously distinctive spheres: finance, media, and politics. Consequently, the 
typical democratic process is no more the only relevant mechanism in many domains of 
economic and social policies. For instance, stock-markets tend to react quite quickly to 
political statements, faster than the process of democratic deliberation. Similarly, 
communication and media tend to have an increasing role in electoral periods but also 
afterwards in the everyday conduct of polity. Furthermore, one observes the growing 
dependency of politicians from large financial support that rarely comes from citizens and 
associations of civil society but from large corporations3.  
 
Nevertheless, it is too early to conclude that a general process of de-democratization is under way, 
just to use the term coined by Charles Tilly. Clearly, some factors of democratization do exist 
(table 5, supra). First, some societies, especially in the social democratic tradition, have preserved the 
efficacy and legitimacy of democratic procedures even though new migrants put some tensions, 
especially in the access to welfare. Second, old European democracies have learnt from their 
failures to implement from outside democratic institutions, for example in Middle-East. Third, 
some Latin-American trajectories bring some hope since actors have learnt from previous 
mistakes both in terms of excessive economic liberalization and authoritarian governments. 
 
Last but not least, many philosophers and political scientists are investigating various complements 
to representative democracy. They propose for instance to develop participative democracy at all level of 
social and economic organizations (Canto-Sperber, 2003; Crouch, 2004; Fukuyama, 2004; 
Schmitter and Trechesel, 2005; Rosanvallon, 2006; Crowley, 2007; Blondiaux, 2008). Recently, 
some politicians have been introducing these proposals into electoral debates. Finally, the current 
subprime crisis makes clear that one of the tasks of the governments is to discipline finance in order 
to assess whether innovations do contribute, or not, to the welfare of the society and are 
compatible with macroeconomic stability. Similarly, some governments dare to put limits to the 
concentration of media and their merging with economic interests…but others do not when 
politicians become the lobbyists of special economic interests.  
 
Proposition 12:  The contemporary world exhibits contradictory trends: diffusion of constitutional democracy 
to new countries but perceived crisis of representative democracy in new and old democratic 
societies…nevertheless de-democratization is not unavoidable. 
VII. 
                                                
A DILEMMA:  RENEWED SOCIAL DEMOCRACY OR SOCIAL 
LIBERALISM? 
The first stage of globalization had popularized the idea of a complete economic determinism for 
national policies: There Is No Alternative (TINA) was a typical motto of this period. 
Consequently, all previous organizations and institutions were supposed to be made fully 
compatible with an extended economic logic expressed at the world level. The demands of 
financiers in terms of shareholder value have renewed these pressures all over the world. For 
some leftist governments, social liberalism appeared as an imperative since the old social 
democratic model was assumed to be obsolete. Nowadays, it is more and more recognized, 
including by international organizations such as OECD, that several institutional configurations 
and not only one, have proven their relevance, resilience and viability. 
 
 
3  The Barack Obama campaign is the 2008 US presidential elections may be an exception to this trend. 
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Let us here risk an assessment of the two options open to left wing political coalitions (table 6) 
and focus upon the specific features of a new social democracy (NSD). 
 
•  Basically, both social democracy and social liberalism accept the challenge of openness to world 
competition, but they differ concerning the respective role of collective action and markets. 
Instead of considering as given all the signals of the market, especially on the labor market, 
NSD defends the imperative of social inclusion, decent living wages and an extended 
solidarity via welfare eventually against the spontaneous market adjustments. Markets operate 
within limits set by rules emerging out of collective deliberation. They are requisites for the 
permanent redeployment of labor in response to competition, changes in the demand and 
innovations. 
 
•  Whereas the role of the State is residual in typical liberal regimes, NSD recognizes to the State 
a central role in financing and organizing the primary and secondary education, the universities, 
research, life long training, the health care and most public services. Consequently, the tax 
system has to be simultaneous well designed and progressive since it redistributes a very large 
fraction of national income (half of GDP in Denmark for instance).   
 
•  Instead of correcting ex post the inequalities generated by markets, NSD attributes to initial 
education the task to develop the generic competences for the larger fraction possible of the 
population, in terms of citizenship, ability to get access to well paid jobs and permanent 
adaptation to the evolution of the economy and technical change via life long learning.  
 
•  Given a long tradition of socialization in local communities of equals, the density of social 
networks concerned by policy formation at the national level and generally the small size of 
social democratic societies, the politicians are deeply embedded into the society. This clear 
evidence of persisting democratic principles and practices contrasts with the trend towards 
the segregation of political elites from the citizens observed in many other political regimes.   
Table 6 – The competition between new social democracy and social-liberalism 
 
New social-democracy Social-liberalism 
1. Empowerment of workers 1. Adaptation of workers to markets 
2. Transformations of market relations in response to 
the primacy of social inclusion 
2. Pure market mechanisms as sources of efficiency in 
response to the primacy of market inclusion 
…They are both responses to globalization 
3. Centrality of the State as instituting a universal 
welfare 
3. A residual role of the State in means tested welfare 
4. Education is a source of social inclusion and 
equalization of opportunities and possibly of 
outcomes 
4. Education is a selection device for access to elite 
and a bridge towards employment 
5. Relative  openness and flexibility in the access to 
political careers  
5. Possible trend towards the segregation of the 
political elite with possible constitution of dynasties 
6. Flexicurity or secure-flexibility 6. Flex-flexibility 
7. Search for the eradication of the intrinsic sources of 
inequalities upstream of market mechanisms 
7. Correct by  taxation and social transfers the more 
visible inequalities generated by the market 
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Proposition 13:  The reformed social democratic societies do continue to reconcile economic dynamic efficiency 
and the stabilization of inequalities 
THE DANISH FLEXICURITY IS NOT A VARIANT OF THE WORKFARE 
Just to contrast the NSD with liberal regime, it might be enlightening to compare the workfare 
typical of liberal capitalism and social liberalism. Both deliver good employment performance but 
they deploy different strategies and have different outcomes (figures 11 and 12). 
 
•  The common principle is to accept labor mobility as a response to the impact of competition 
on the flux of job destruction and creation. But workfare might imply a wage reduction if the 
competences of the workers have become obsolete, whereas NSD requires that labor 
mobility is oriented towards higher skills and value added jobs (Boyer, 2006a). 
Figure 11 – The workfare: Reducing welfare in order to strengthen market mechanisms  
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Figure 12 – The flexicurity: A new configuration for solidarity via a reform of welfare 
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•  A second divergence relates precisely to training decisions. In workfare regimes, the priority is 
the return to employment even in a low paid job with few or no concern for an upward 
career in terms of skills. The choice of training is up to individuals. Social democratic regimes 
put strong incentives and even constraints in order to propitiate the return to an employment 
but they take into account the medium term perspectives concerning the competences and 
the probability of keeping a good job in the long run. A public agency simultaneously 
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manages and organizes training and unemployment benefits in order to optimize careers and 
not instantaneous access to an employment. 
 
•  A third difference concerns precisely the level of unemployment benefits (UB). Of course any 
government is trying to optimize the management of this component of the welfare. In one 
case, the UB are voluntary kept as low as possible in order put strong incentives for new job 
acceptation under the threat of pauperization. In the NSD no unemployed has to become 
poor during the move from one job to another, since the UB are sufficiently generous for low 
wage earners. An active employment policy is in charge of controlling the opportunist 
behavior of the unemployed, rather rare indeed, whereas this is the obsession of liberal 
regimes.     
 
In theoretical terms, the Danish flexicurity model just described displays an original 
complementarity between the absence of legal constraints upon hiring and firing, a generous 
welfare and an active employment policy. By contrast, American and British workfares organize a 
complementarity between labor mobility and a quite lean welfare (low and stable minimum wage, 
poor unemployment benefit for the low skill workers). No surprise then if inequalities are much 
more reduced within NSD than for liberal regimes.    
 
 
Proposition 14:  Reformed social democracy and social liberalism are competing strategies, since flexicurity is 
not equivalent to workfare. 
VIII. THE CONTRASTED FACTORS THAT SHAPE THE FUTURE OF 
DEMOCRACY AND CAPITALISM 
All the previous results converge toward a major conclusion: it would be erroneous to try to find 
a general and unique answer to the issues of the directions of contemporary transformations of 
capitalism and democracy. The same factors have a different intensity and interact with quite 
different national trajectories. But this recognition of the diversity of configurations is not at all 
an evidence for a complete relativism (“every thing goes”). Actually, an Institutional Historical 
Comparative Analysis is quite enlightening (Thelen, 2003). This methodology has been adopted 
by régulationist research and applied to the transformations of economic regimes, but some social 
historians have developed a similar approach concerning the configuration of democracy. Let us 
follow here the approach by Charles Tilly (2007) in his final chapter about the future of 
democracy. Looking back at history, he found that three distinctive factors shape 
democratization (table 7).  
 
• The integration of trust networks into public politics exhibits a strong differentiation among old 
democracies. If Denmark is again a good example of integration and if Japan is also in a 
favorable position, by contrast the American society shows multiple evidences of 
autonomization of trust networks: finance has become more and more powerful and 
influential, whereas media tend to overcome the voice of citizens in the expression of 
demand addressed to the State. France enjoys the legacy of a good State capacity, but some of 
the American and quite preoccupying trends are present in French politics. 
 
• The second criteria, i.e. the risk of the emergence of autonomous powers independent from the 
State is not so much relevant for old democracies, but of course it is the crucial problem in 
most African societies and in the past even in contemporary Russia.  
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Table 7 –The three factors that shape domestic democratization processes 
 
 DENMARK US UK FRANCE JAPAN 
 
 
INTEGRATION 
OF TRUST 
NETWORKS 
 
 
 
Extended 
 
 
Trend towards 
an 
autonomization 
of finance, 
politics, media 
 
In public 
services, trust 
networks tend to 
be replaced by 
market 
mechanisms 
 
 
Traditionally 
high but 
declining 
 
Significant at the 
local level and to 
some extent in 
the political 
sphere 
 
REDUCTION OF 
AUTONOMOUS 
POWER 
 
 
No more the 
issue 
 
 
Increased behind 
the scene power 
 
State more 
dependent from 
economic and 
financial interests
Still an 
integrative role 
of the State, but 
emerging social 
and urban 
exclusion 
 
No more a 
problem 
 
 
INSULATION 
FROM 
CATEGORICAL 
INEQUALITIES 
 
Clear for Danish 
citizens, but 
contradictory 
tensions for 
migrants 
 
No, still ethnic 
based 
inequalities, gated 
communities, 
Unequal access 
to health, 
education 
 
In spite of an 
early welfare, 
growing 
inequalities 
reflected into 
polity 
 
Rhetorical 
equality but 
emerging breach 
between elite and 
citizens 
 
Traditional belief 
(belonging to a 
middle class) but 
potentially 
challenged since 
the 90s 
 
Source: Largely inspired by Tilly’s model (2007). 
 
• The insulation of public politics from categorical inequality is an important issue for quite all 
democracies. Even in Denmark, the integration in the society of migrant workers is a hot 
question, with direct consequences for the access to welfare. But quite interestingly, social 
partners do develop integrating procedures for migrant workers into the Danish high skill, 
high wage economy. This tension between political citizenship and social rights of workers is 
quite significant indeed in most of the countries that built a form of flexicurity, such as 
Denmark but also Netherlands. Under the same criteria, the US are experiencing a form of 
de-democratization since the integration of the poorest fraction of the black community has 
receded, the access to education and health is more and more unequal and gated communities 
prosper… In a sense, France is suffering from a severe urban exclusion, but of course the 
legacy of a universalist welfare system still moderate the widening of inequalities. In Japan, 
economists debate about the depth of inequalities after the bursting out of the 80s bubble 
(Tachibanaki, 2005) but international comparisons show that this country is closer to Europe 
and social democratic societies than to the US. Could the Japanese society evolve towards a 
civic social democracy in order to stop a mild form of de-democratization presently observed 
(Yamaguchi, 2005; 2007; Yamaguchi & al., 2005) 
 
 
Proposition 15:  In spite of common factors and threats, among them globalization, the Nation State still is 
the main arena where economy and polity interact and generate idiosyncratic trajectories.   
…..WOULD THE NEW SOCIAL DEMOCRACY BE THE BEST RAMPART OF 
POLITICAL DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS? 
The cursory international comparison sketched previously suggests the following taxonomy:  
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• On one side of US type liberal capitalism, the triangular relationships between State, Civil 
Society and the Economy, display a quite specific configuration. The rise of the bargaining 
power of business and finance exert a strong influence over the formation of economic 
policy. In a sense the State reflects these specific interests and in some instances it imposes to 
civil society a downgrading of economic, social and ultimately political rights. Consequently, 
in liberal capitalism, weak workers finally mean weak citizens, or at least a quite unequal use 
of political rights, as evidenced for instance by electoral participation rates across social 
groups. Thus the weakness of social rights negatively spills over civil and political rights 
(figure 13): this might be a general interpretation for the de-democratization process 
occurring in US, already pointed out by table 7. 
 
Figure 13 – Weak socioeconomic rights and democratization: the dilemma of liberal capitalism? 
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Figure 14 – The virtuous circle between democracy and social democracy 
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• This negative spiral is not a universal phenomenon since most social democratic countries 
experience a noticeable stability of democratic rights or even their extension to new domains 
(gender, disability, life long learning,…). This configuration can be interpreted as an evidence 
for a synergy between a basic business/labour compromise, permanently updated in its 
content, and strong codification of citizens rights that correct the structural unbalance typical 
of the employment relation. Active citizens, largely entitled of various social rights (free 
access to education at all levels, to healthcare, generous unemployment benefits, intense 
retraining,…) make strong workers in the economic arena itself. The embeddedness of social 
democracy makes quite resilient the democratic principles and practices in the political sphere 
(figure 14). 
 
The present analytical framework delivers a quite unconventional diagnosis. Mainstream analysts 
forecast the irreversible rolling back of welfare and consequently the progressive erosion of social 
democracy and its convergence towards a minor variant of liberal capitalism. Here it is argued 
that this is neither the unique nor a necessary evolution. Firstly, once reformed, social democracy 
has exhibited a strong resilience since it still makes compatible dynamic efficiency along with the 
search for social justice and moderate inequalities. Secondly, the recognition of socioeconomic 
rights make democracy in the political sphere more active and lively and it seems to prevent any 
post democracy fatigue (Crouch, 2004), and minimize the risk of de-democratization (Tilly, 
2007). Hence this last proposition: 
 
 
Proposition 16:  In liberal capitalism, the weakness of social rights makes probable a process of de-
democratization, but in renewed social democracy, extended socioeconomic rights do sustain 
the ongoing process of democratization.   
CONCLUSION:  
The conjunction of the previous propositions is already a kind of summary, but they can 
themselves be synthesized. 
 
C1.  The so called market democratic society does not represent a single configuration, nor is it a one best 
way that would be easy to implement or import. 
 
C2.  Capitalism sets into motion a permanent evolution of economic and social institutions and 
organizations. Democratization does not converge towards a steady state but it is a permanent 
process, featuring both epochs of progress and regress. 
 
C3.  At odds with the trend to the autonomization of economics and political sciences and the 
different logics of the economy and the polity, de facto economic regimes and political 
organizations co-evolve. Consequently, one observes contrasted trajectories, even in the presence of 
common general trends such as individualization, globalization and financialization.  
 
C4.  Since two decades, democratization has been diffusing to Eastern and Central Europe, Latin 
America and many other post colonial societies but simultaneously citizens have been more 
and more disenchanted with the actual working of representative democracy. Quite a paradox 
indeed! One understands then the general search for other democratic forms such as 
participatory democracy. 
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C5.  From an ideological/ programmatic point of view, old democracies face the choice among 
at least three strategies: liberal capitalism, social liberalism and renewed social democracy. 
They correspond to different political alliances and they display quite contrasted complementarities 
among the political and economic spheres. 
 
C6.  The Nation State still matters in terms of political constitutional order and implementation of 
the institutional forms that shape economic activity i.e. régulation modes: the threats and 
challenges addressed to democratization drastically differ from one Nation State to another.  
 
C7.  The renewed social democracy seems to prolong the Golden Age since it reconciles dynamic 
efficiency and social justice in the context of globalization. This could or should replace the 
liberal capitalism as the benchmark for policy makers. Nevertheless, there are many obstacles 
to the diffusion of this new form of social-democracy since it is the outcome of century 
long and quite specific co-evolution of polity and economy, and it was initiated by small 
and densely networked communities that extended the related trust and procedures at the 
national State level. More than a pure but impossible imitation, governments should aim at 
hybridizing social democratic principles along with the nature of specialization, domestic 
traditions and political styles. In France, State should play a major role in such a process of 
hybridization but in Japan it could originate from the initiative of civil society, thus 
generating a Civic Social Democratic configuration.   
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